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Comment
Reasonable Means: Unavailable Declarants After
United States v. Yida
Damon Brinson*
In 1999, Yacov Yida allegedly participated in a large-scale
ecstasy smuggling operation with several co-conspirators, in-
cluding Israeli citizen David Reziniano. 1 In 2004, Reziniano
pleaded guilty in the Central District of California to conspiring
to import the drug. 2 Reziniano completed his sentence in late
2005 and was released into the custody of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) for deportation.3
Shortly before his deportation, the government acquired a
material witness warrant for Reziniano to secure his testimony
in Yida's approaching trial.4 Reziniano remained in federal cus-
tody on that warrant through the conclusion of Yida's trial-a
total of five months-and provided critical testimony against
Yida for the government. 5 On April 13, 2006, after three days of
jury deliberations, the judge declared a mistrial.6 After the gov-
ernment secured his promise to return and testify in the event
of a retrial, DHS deported Reziniano to Israel.7
The court scheduled Yida's new trial for July 24, 2006, and
though Reziniano initially indicated that he would return and
testify, he later refused, citing a serious health condition that
* J.D. Candidate 2009, University of Minnesota Law School; M.A. 1994,
Purdue University. I thank Professor Bradley G. Clary for his insightful ob-
servations during the drafting of this Comment, and Nick Smith and Jenni
Vainik for their advice and care in editing. Finally, special thanks to Ana and
Leo, for their infinite support and love. Copyright © 2008 by Damon J. Brin-
son.
1. Brief for the United States as Appellant at 3, United States v. Yida,
498 F.3d 945 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-10460).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 4.
5. Id. at 4-6.
6. Id. at 5.
7. Id. at 6-7.
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required treatment.8 On July 5, 2006, the government moved to
admit Reziniano's cross-examined prior testimony in the new
trial as a hearsay exception under Rule 804 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence (Evidence Rules), arguing that Reziniano
was unavailable and, additionally, that a medical condition
prevented him from attending. 9
The district court denied the motion on the grounds that,
despite the government's concerted efforts to secure Reziniano's
return, it was "unreasonable" for the government to have de-
ported him in the first place, especially considering its failure
to seek advice on the matter from either defense counsel or the
court before Reziniano's release. 10 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed, stating that the requirement in Rule 804 that the
movant be "unable to procure the declarant's attendance" by
"reasonable means," applies to the "government's actions both
before and after Reziniano's material witness warrant was re-
leased and he was deported."1 1 All of Yida's trial testimony
would be excluded.
As the United States continues to "process" detainees alle-
gedly involved in the 2001 terrorist attacks and the subsequent
wars, 12 and as it adjusts the permeability of its borders in re-
sponse to national security and immigration policies, 13 it is
likely that criminal cases involving hearsay from unavailable
declarants-admitted for both prosecution and defense-will
become more common. Crimes involving international terror-
ism and illegal immigration necessarily involve noncitizens,
many of whom are beyond U.S. subpoena power in their home
countries. 14 To the extent the government is involved in the
8. Id. at 7-8.
9. Id. at 9.
10. United States v. Yida, No. CR 00-00274 CRB, 2006 WL 1980390, at *6
(N.D. Cal. July 13, 2006), aff'd, 498 F.3d 945 (9th Cir. 2007). The district court
found that the government had not met its burden in demonstrating that Re-
ziniano was unavailable under Rule 804(a)(4). Id. at *2 n.1.
11. Yida, 498 F.3d at 952, 957.
12. See William Glaberson, Court Advances Military Trials for Detainees,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 18805079; Josh White &
Joby Warrick, U.S. to Allow Key Detainees to Request Lawyers: 14 Terrorism
Suspects Given Legal Forms at Guantanamo, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 2007, at
A01.
13. For an example of recent federal legislation, see H.R. REP. No. 109-
345, pt. 1, at 1 (2005).
14. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1783(a) (2000) ("A court of the United States may
order the issuance of a subpoena requiring the appearance ... of a national or
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"unavailability" of the declarants through deportation or pris-
oner-of-war detention, the core issue in Yida will be central to
the trial strategy: under what circumstances may hearsay from
unavailable declarants-made unavailable through govern-
ment action-be admitted at trial?
Of perhaps greater impact, due to sheer volume, is interna-
tional tourism and the role that foreign tourists play as materi-
al witnesses in U.S. courts. Tens of millions of foreign tourists
visit the United States each year, and tens of thousands of
them are victims of crime. 15 If even a small percentage give
sworn statements in criminal proceedings, the relevance is ob-
vious-the witnesses are beyond U.S. subpoena power if al-
lowed to return home. 16 To the extent that the government is
involved in "allowing" the witnesses to depart, the question re-
mains as to the admissibility of this large volume of testimonial
evidence.
This Comment discusses the effects of Yida on the applica-
tion of the Evidence Rules and the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the federal material witness statute, and the inter-
relation between these provisions and the Confrontation Clause
of the Sixth Amendment. Part I of this Comment reviews the
legal background of the Confrontation Clause, the Evidence
Rules, and the federal material witness statute. Part II dis-
cusses Yida in relation to federal circuit court and U.S. Su-
preme Court precedent. Part III critically examines the legal
issues raised in Yida and proposes alternative elements for fu-
ture decisions in the federal courts. The Comment argues that
the legal analysis extended by the Ninth Circuit in Yida is
based on a strained interpretation of precedent that results in a
flawed, overly broad response to a narrow legal issue. Finally,
the Comment concludes that the proposed alternative elements
are consistent with existing statutes, case law, and the funda-
mental constitutional rights of confrontation and liberty.
resident of the United States who is in a foreign country ...." (emphasis add-
ed)).
15. John C. Crotts, Theoretical Perspectives on Tourist Criminal Victimi-
sation, J. TOURISM STUD., May 1996, at 1, 2-3 (noting that the 1993 rate of
crime against tourists in Florida-then an "all time low"-was 61.28 per
100,000 tourists); Carolee Walker, United States a Top Destination for Foreign
Travelers in 2006, AMERICA.GOV, Oct. 24, 2006, http://www.america.gov/st/
washfile-english/2006/October/20061024154724bcreklaw0.7384302.html.
16. See 28 U.S.C. § 1783(a).
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I. CONFRONTATION'S ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT
The core legal issues decided in Yida are grounded in Eng-
lish common law, the U.S. Constitution, and federal statutory
and case law. A brief overview of the relevant principles and in-
terrelated statutes provides a foundation for analyzing the ex-
tent of the Yida decision in this unsettled area of criminal pro-
cedure and constitutional law.
A. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that
"[iun all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him."17
Today, this clause represents the right of defendants to face
their accusers at trial and to cross-examine the parties making
admissible statements against them.18 Over time, courts have
applied the clause in several forms, including a right to face-to-
face confrontation with one's accuser, 19 a right to cross-examine
one's accuser,20 and as a constitutional foundation of modern
hearsay rules. 21
Legal scholars and jurists commonly argue that the Sixth
Amendment was generally a reaction to the admissibility of
"Marian depositions" under English statutory law.22 These de-
positions were recorded by the Justice of the Peace and con-
sisted of sworn statements of the accuser and unsworn state-
ments of the accused.23 Notably, these statements were
admissible at trial even if the declarant was "dead or absent."24
17. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
18. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004).
19. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 849 (1990).
20. Id. at 845-46.
21. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63-64 n.6 (1980) (noting the interre-
lation of cross-examination, evaluation of witness demeanor, and the risk of
perjury in determining the witness's reliability).
22. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43-44, 50 (noting that the Confrontation
Clause was intended to remedy precisely the "evil" represented by the ex parte
examinations that the Marian statutes authorized); see also Thomas Y. Da-
vies, What Did the Framers Know, and When Did They Know It? Fictional
Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105, 128 & n.73
(2005) (explaining certain aspects of the Marian statutes' operation and pur-
pose).
23. Davies, supra note 22, at 114-15 (describing the process of securing
and using Marian depositions).
24. Id. at 130 (quoting SIR MATTHEW HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN: OR, A
METHODICAL SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS RELATING TO THAT SUB-
JECT 262-63 (London, Assigns of Richard and Edward Atkyns 1707)).
1894 [92:1891
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The anti-Marian foundations of the Sixth Amendment suggest
that the framers supported a stronger confrontation right, as
embodied by the English common law rule that required cross-
examination of witnesses against the accused. 25
Despite the fundamental role of the right to confront wit-
nesses in the adjudication of criminal cases, the Confrontation
Clause rarely received Supreme Court attention until 1965,26
and the Court did not expound significant policy foundations
for its application until 1970.27 Notwithstanding the Clause's
rare appearance, since 1895 the Supreme Court has consistent-
ly held that the Confrontation Clause contains two fundamen-
tal considerations: the jury's ability to judge the trustworthi-
ness of witnesses by directly viewing them, and the defendant's
ability to test the memory and truthfulness of witnesses
through cross-examination.28 Today, these same principles
serve as guideposts for the application of the Sixth Amend-
ment's confrontation right in a wide variety of jurisdictions and
modern testimonial contexts. 29
25. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 48-50 (quoting John Adams as saying that
[i]nterrogatories are unknown at common Law, and Englishmen and common
Lawyers have an aversion to them if not an Abhorrence of them,"' and noting
that the Confrontation Clause was originally directed at the "civil-law mode of
criminal procedure" (emphasis added)). A contrary view suggests that Marian
depositions might have supported cross-examination and, in practice, the ad-
missibility of statements of absent declarants might not have been as regular
as the statutes' language implies. See Robert Kry, Confrontation Under the
Marian Statutes: A Response to Professor Davies, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 493, 500-
01 (2007).
26. Roger W. Kirst, Does Crawford Provide a Stable Foundation for Con-
frontation Doctrine?, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 35, 40 (2005) (noting that, in the first
174 years of the Confrontation Clause's existence, the "Supreme Court applied
it in only a few federal criminal cases").
27. See id. at 41; see also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 173-74 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring) ("[T]he Confrontation Clause comes to us on faded
parchment....").
28. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 57 ("Our case law has been largely consistent
with these two principles."); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43
(1895). But see Kirst, supra note 26, at 38 ("[Tlhe original meaning of the Con-
frontation Clause did not include specific confrontation rules.").
29. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54; see also People v. McClanahan, 729
N.E.2d 470, 477 (Ill. 2000) ("Trial by affidavit is the primary evil that the con-
frontation clause was designed to prevent."). In the military context, see Bai-
ley v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 459, 461-62 (Fed. Cl. 2002) (emphasizing that
"[d]emeanor is of the utmost importance in the determination of the credibility
of a witness" and including a long list of supporting sources demonstrating the
relevance of confrontation), United States v. Simpson, 60 M.J. 674, 676-78 (A.
Ct. Crim. App. 2004) (engaging in a historical analysis of the Confrontation
Clause, its foundations, and its application via the Military Rules of Evidence),
2008] 1895
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B. HEARSAY AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
The Evidence Rules govern the admissibility of evidence in
federal court. 30 Rule 801 defines hearsay as an out-of-court
statement offered for its truth31 and Rule 802 provides that
such statements are not admissible at trial unless they fall un-
der an exception, outlined in the Evidence Rules or by statute.3 2
The hearsay exceptions in Rule 804 apply to statements made
by declarants who are unavailable to testify at trial.33 The
"former testimony" exception in Rule 804(b)(1) provides that
testimonial statements are not barred as hearsay if the decla-
rant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity
to cross-examine the declarant. 34 In the federal courts, a decla-
rant may be "unavailable" where the declarant asserts a claim
of privilege against self-incrimination, 35 refuses to testify de-
spite a court order,36 suffers from a lack of memory, 37 is de-
and United States v. McCollum, 56 M.J. 837, 839-41 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App.
2002) (reconciling the Confrontation Clause and its principles with the Mili-
tary Rules of Evidence). From the Tax Court, see Hicks Co. v. Comm'r of In-
ternal Revenue, 56 T.C. 982, 1017-19 (T.C. 1972) (discussing the application
of Supreme Court precedent dealing with the right to confront in the context of
the Tax Court and its rules).
30. An Act to Establish Rules of Evidence for Certain Courts and Proceed-
ings, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
31. FED. R. EVID. 801(a)-(c).
32. Id. R. 802.
33. Id. R. 804.
34. Id. R. 804(b)(1). Since the meanings of the terms "testimonial," "un-
available," and "cross-examine" are not further explicated by statute, case law
has established working definitions. The Supreme Court most recently classi-
fied as "testimonial" those statements made to authorities where the primary
purpose of the interrogation was the collection of evidence potentially useful in
the prosecution of the alleged crime. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813,
822 (2006). The Evidence Rules generally constrain cross-examination to the
subject matter addressed in a witness's direct examination, but the court may
relax these restrictions if necessary. See FED. R. EVID. 611(b). The right to
cross-examine may be violated when it is too tightly restricted. See Eastridge
v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 2d 26, 35, 57, 59 (D.D.C. 2005). But the right is
"subject to reasonable limits" by the trial judge. See Flores v. United States,
698 A.2d 474, 479 (D.C. 1997).
35. See United States v. Dolah, 245 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding
unavailability "even though the Government has the power to displace the
witness's [Fifth Amendment] privilege with a grant of use immunity").
36. See United States v. Reed, 227 F.3d 763, 767, 769 (7th Cir. 2000) (find-
ing, in a retrial, that the declarant who testified in the first trial, but refused
to testify in the second "was unavailable" in the second trial).
37. See Pink Supply Corp. v. Hiebert, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1334, 1345 (D.
Minn. 1985) (holding that the declarant's "failure to recall [the] conversation
1896 [92:1891
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ceased,38 or is simply absent despite the proponent's reasonable
efforts to procure the declarant's attendance. 39 The final sen-
tence of Rule 804(a) states that this unavailability exception
shall not apply to allow admission of hearsay where the propo-
nent has, through intentional wrongdoing, caused the declarant
to refuse, or to be unable, to appear at trial.40
1. Ohio v. Roberts: Indicia of Reliability
In 1980, the Supreme Court established what became
known as the "indicia of reliability" test for determining admis-
sibility of hearsay statements by unavailable declarants. 41 In
Ohio v. Roberts, the Court held that the Confrontation Clause
restricts the admissibility of hearsay in two ways. 42 First, it re-
quires the hearsay proponent either to produce declarants for
cross-examination or to demonstrate their unavailability. 43
Second, in the event that a proponent demonstrates the decla-
rant's unavailability, the Confrontation Clause limits the ad-
mission of hearsay to those statements having an "indicia of re-
liability"44 to "afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for
evaluating the truth of the prior statement."45 The Roberts
Court held that sufficient reliability "can be inferred without
more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted
[in which the statements were made] satisfies the.., definition of an unavail-
able declarant" under Rule 804(a)(3)), aff'd, 788 F.2d 1313 (8th Cir. 1986).
38. See Estate of Bratton v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 24 F. Supp. 2d 667,
670 (N.D. Miss. 1998), rev'd on other grounds, 215 F.3d 516, 516 (5th Cir.
2000).
39. See United States v. Morsley, 64 F.3d 907, 919 n.l (4th Cir. 1995)
(finding that "a good faith effort to secure [the declarant's] presence at the tri-
al, including obtaining an arrest warrant and attempting to serve him" met
the burden of demonstrating unavailability under Rule 804(a)(5)).
40. FED. R. EVID. 804(a).
41. See Kirst, supra note 26, at 49 (noting that, in the Ohio v. Roberts opi-
nion, Justice Harry Blackmun used the phrase "indicia of reliability" four
times in three paragraphs and explained that the purpose of the Confrontation
Clause is to "augment accuracy in the factfinding process by ensuring the de-
fendant an effective means to test adverse evidence").
42. 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980).
43. Id. The Court held that "[a] demonstration of unavailability, however,
is not always required. In Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970), for example,
the Court found the utility of trial confrontation so remote that it did not re-
quire the prosecution to produce a seemingly available witness." Id. at 65 n.7.
44. Id. at 65 (quoting Dutton, 400 U.S. at 89) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
45. Id. at 65-66 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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hearsay exception." 46 Absent such an exception, the hearsay
must be excluded unless it can be shown to have "particula-
rized guarantees of trustworthiness."4 7
A series of Supreme Court cases from 1986 to the land-
mark Crawford v. Washington48 case in 2004 expanded admis-
sibility under the Roberts test. The Court first distinguished co-
conspirator statements from prior testimony and held that such
statements are "usually irreplaceable as substantive evidence,"
and must be admissible by the prosecution regardless of the
availability of the declarant. 49 One year later, the Court held
that an independent inquiry into reliability is not required
when the evidence is otherwise admissible through a "firmly
rooted hearsay exception."50 Then, in 1990, the Court continued
to emphasize reliability, but narrowed its application by hold-
ing that, while "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness"
are based on the "totality of the circumstances," the only facts
relevant to corroborate such a determination are those relating
to the "making of the statement" and the trustworthiness of the
declarant. 51 Later that year, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
wrote that the Sixth Amendment does not bar the hearsay
statements of a child abuse victim if the child is available to
testify only via closed-circuit television. 52 Finally, in 1992, on
the narrow question of whether Roberts established a rule that
"no out-of-court statement would be admissible without a show-
ing of unavailability," the Court answered in the negative. 53 It
held that Roberts required a showing of unavailability only
when the hearsay statements were made in a prior judicial pro-
ceeding. 54
2. Crawford's Tightening
The trend of broader admissibility of "reliable" testimonial
hearsay abruptly reversed in 2004, when the decision in Craw-
46. Id. at 66.
47. Id.
48. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
49. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 396, 400 (1986).
50. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987) (quoting Roberts,
448 U.S. at 66) (internal quotation marks omitted).
51. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 819 (1990).
52. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 860 (1990) (holding that the Con-
frontation Clause does not prohibit the use of closed-circuit television proce-
dures for conducting in-court testimony by child victims in abuse cases).
53. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 353 (1992).
54. Id. at 354.
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ford strongly rejected the Roberts indicia-of-reliability test and
narrowed the admissibility of hearsay when the declarant does
not testify.55 Through Justice Scalia's lengthy historical analy-
sis, the Crawford opinion identified two propositions within the
meaning of the Confrontation Clause. 56 First, the Clause is di-
rected primarily at curbing the use of testimonial evidence from
ex parte examinations against the accused.57 Second, the
Clause prohibits the admission of any testimonial hearsay of a
nontestifying witness unless the accused had a prior opportuni-
ty to cross-examine the declarant. 58 Justice Antonin Scalia em-
phasized that the Sixth Amendment is properly read as "admit-
ting only those exceptions established at the time of the
founding,"5 9 concluded that unavailability and a "prior oppor-
tunity to cross-examine" were requirements of English common
law in 1791, and found that the Sixth Amendment must con-
tain those limitations. 60
The clearer, more categorical test of Crawford produced
"immediate and substantial" impacts.61 Testimonial evidence
from unavailable victims and witnesses that was likely admiss-
ible under Roberts was now barred where there was no oppor-
tunity for prior cross-examination.6 2 And videotaped victim
statements, inherently deemed reliable due to their preserva-
tion of the witness's character and demeanor, no longer served
as valuable prosecutorial tools for securing and preserving tes-
timonial evidence, unless, of course, the witness was willing
and able to testify. 63
55. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61-62 (2004).
56. Id. at 50.
57. Id. at 50-53 ("In sum, even if the Sixth Amendment is not solely con-
cerned with testimonial hearsay, that is its primary object, and interrogations
by law enforcement officers fall squarely within that class.").
58. Id. at 53-54.
59. Id. at 54.
60. Id.
61. See Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and
Ensuring the Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 512 (2005)
("Crawford has changed confrontation analysis enormously. Its concrete im-
pact was immediate and substantial in both appellate and trial courts on the
evidence rendered inadmissible."). For a list of cases reversed under Crawford,
see id. at 527 n.70.
62. See id.
63. See Myrna Raeder, Remember the Ladies and the Children Too: Craw-
ford's Impact on Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK. L. REV.
311, 328-31 (reviewing the pre-Crawford history of evidence-based prosecu-
tion and noting that more effort will be required, post-Crawford, to obtain the
cooperation of reluctant domestic abuse victims).
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C. PROCURING WITNESSES AND PRESERVING TESTIMONY
For a variety of reasons-fear of retribution, for example-
some victims and witnesses resist testifying in court. To ad-
dress such situations, federal law provides that witnesses with
material testimony in a federal criminal proceeding may be ar-
rested and detained, through a material witness warrant, in
order to secure their presence at trial.64
1. Detention of Material Witnesses
A federal material witness warrant is proper when based
on probable cause, established by two criteria: the testimony
must be material6 5 and circumstances may be impracticable for
securing the witness's presence by subpoena.66 The terms of de-
tention and release of material witnesses are governed by the
same federal statute controlling the detention and release of
defendants pending their federal criminal trials.67
In United States v. Nai, material witnesses were captured
among more than one hundred Chinese aliens smuggled into
the United States aboard a cargo vessel.68 Their detention was
justified upon the government's showing by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that, if the material witnesses were released, they
would attempt to flee, remain in the United States, and evade
the Immigration and Naturalization Service. 69 And in Aguilar-
Ayala v. Ruiz, upon showing that witnesses were "undocu-
mented aliens subject to deportation (and criminal sanction) in
connection with their entry into this country," and in light of
the fact that the witnesses had waived the appeal of their de-
portation orders, the government was justified in detaining the
64. 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2000). The statutory term "criminal proceeding' in-
cludes grand jury proceedings. See United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42,
49-51 (2d Cir. 2003).
65. The District Court for the Southern District of New York held that
"the representation of the United States Attorney as to materiality is suffi-
cient for that requirement to be met." In re Application of U.S. for a Material
Witness Warrant, 213 F. Supp. 2d 287, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
66. 18 U.S.C. § 3144; see United States v. McVeigh, 940 F. Supp. 1541,
1562 (D. Colo. 1996) ("The burden.., is to show probable cause to believe that
it is or may be impracticable to rely on a subpoena to get the witness before
the grand jury." (emphasis omitted)).
67. 18 U.S.C. § 3144.
68. 949 F. Supp. 42, 43 (D. Mass. 1996).
69. Id. at 46.
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witnesses to "guarantee[] the admissibility of their testimo-
ny."70
Detained material witnesses, like defendants, are entitled
to a bail hearing and may be released on conditions determined
by the presiding judge to be sufficient to secure the presence of
the witness at trial.7 1 After the criminal proceeding has begun,
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure govern the terms of
the release or continued detention of witnesses. 72 In exceptional
circumstances, the court may release a material witness upon
the motion of a party and after the witness's testimony is ade-
quately preserved via deposition. 73 Such exceptional circum-
stances are determined by the materiality of the testimony and
the likelihood that the witness will be unavailable to testify at
trial. 74 The district courts of New York and Virginia recently
held, respectively, that findings of exceptional circumstances
are made on a case-by-case basis75 and that material evidence
in depositions requested by defendants is limited to that which
is exculpatory, not merely cumulative or corroborative of other
evidence. 76 In Texas, where a standing judicial order mandated
the release of custodial witnesses within sixty days, and where
that order would have resulted in the release of a material wit-
ness before trial, the exceptional-circumstances standard was
met justifying the deposition and release of the witnesses. 77
The mere taking of a deposition under exceptional circums-
tances, however, does not ensure the admissibility of the evi-
70. 973 F.2d 411, 418-19 (5th Cir. 1992).
71. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a)-(c), (e)-(f) (noting that continued detention must
be based on "clear and convincing" evidence that "no condition or combination
of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required
and the safety of any other person and the community").
72. FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(b).
73. Id. R. 15(a)(1).
74. United States v. Liner, 435 F.3d 920, 924 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that
the denial of a motion to depose a witness was appropriate where, notwith-
standing a finding that the witness was unavailable, the defendant "offered no
evidence to support [his] claim" that the witness's testimony would be material
to his defense).
75. United States v. Stein, 482 F. Supp. 2d 360, 363 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(citing United States v. Dillman, 15 F.3d 384, 389 (5th Cir. 1994)).
76. United States v. Rosen, 240 F.R.D. 204, 209 n.7 (E.D. Va. 2007)
("[E]vidence is material ... if there is a 'reasonable probability' that its disclo-
sure would have caused a different result, i.e. when suppression of the evi-
dence undermines confidence in the trial outcome[]." (quoting Kyles v. Whit-
ley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995))).
77. United States v. Allie, 978 F.2d 1401, 1405-06 (5th Cir. 1992).
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dence at trial. 78 The Ninth Circuit reiterated in 2006 that, un-
like in civil cases, depositions under the Federal Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure are prohibited for the sole purpose of discov-
ery.79
2. Preservation of Testimony
Rule 15(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure per-
mits the recording of depositions in any manner compliant with
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provided that "[t]he scope
and manner of the deposition examination and cross-
examination must be the same as would be allowed during tri-
al."8 0 Rule 30(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ex-
pressly allows recording by audio, video (with audio), and ste-
nography. 81
The subsequent use of the preserved deposition testimony
at trial is governed by the Evidence Rules.8 2 As the depositions
themselves are "out-of-court statements offered for their truth,"
their admissibility is analyzed under the standard hearsay
rules-in order to be admissible under Crawford, the prosecu-
tion must establish that the witness is unavailable and that the
defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness
prior to the admission of the evidence.8 3 The deposition must be
barred from admission at trial if either of these standards is
not met.8 4
Delineating one of the limits at this intersection between
the right to confront and the necessity to depose witnesses out
of court, the Eighth Circuit held that, though a "videotaped de-
position supplies an environment substantially comparable to a
trial..., where the defendant [is] not permitted to be an active
participant in the video deposition, this procedural substitute is
78. United States v. Guadian-Salazar, 824 F.2d 344, 346 n.1 (5th Cir.
1987) (holding that, where border patrol agents took videotaped depositions
and then released illegal aliens at the Mexican border, the deprivation of the
defendant's confrontation right was fatally prejudicial).
79. See United States v. Fei Ye, 436 F.3d 1117, 1123 (9th Cir. 2006).
80. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(e).
81. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(3).
82. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(f).
83. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
84. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(f) (providing that the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence control admissibility of deposition evidence); FED. R. EVID. 801 (defining
depositions as hearsay); id. R. 803, 804 (describing circumstances in which
hearsay may be admitted when the declarant is not present at trial).
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constitutionally infirm."8 5 In that case, the confrontation was
unidirectional in that the witness was unaware that the defen-
dant was able to monitor the witness's testimony remotely.8 6
II. UNITED STATES V. YIDA
There is no argument that Reziniano's testimony under
oath at Yida's first trial now comprises "testimonial" hearsay,
fully cross-examined by the defense.8 7 Also, there is agreement
that since Reziniano is absent and refuses to testify in the new
trial,8 8 he is beyond the subpoena power of the court,8 9 and the
government is not able to "procure [his] attendance."90 Finally,
as found by the district court and court of appeals, the govern-
ment acted in good faith in deporting Reziniano and in trying to
secure his presence at the new trial. 91
A. SIXTH AMENDMENT PRECEDENT
The Yida facts appear to support a finding that Reziniano's
prior testimony is admissible under Crawford: the declarant is
unavailable and the adverse party had prior opportunity to
cross-examine. But Yida contested the first Crawford prong,
questioning whether the circumstances of Reziniano's absence
affect the determination of his "unavailability."92 Yida argued
that the definition of "unavailable" in Rule 804(a)(5)-that the
declarant is absent and the "proponent of [the] statement has
been unable to procure the declarant's attendance. .. by
process or other reasonable means"93-establishes a duty to use
reasonable means both before and after the declarant's ab-
sence. 94 Yida argued that the government's deportation of Re-
ziniano, after the mistrial and before the new trial was sche-
duled, was unreasonable, and therefore, Reziniano is not
unavailable. 95
85. United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815, 821 (8th Cir. 1979).
86. Id. at 817.
87. United States v. Yida, 498 F.3d 945, 949 n.5, 950 (9th Cir. 2007).
88. Id. at 949.
89. Id. at 948 n.4.
90. Id. at 961.
91. Id. at 957.
92. Appellee Yacov Yida's Opposition Brief at 9-10, United States v. Yida,
498 F.3d 945 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-10460).
93. FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(5).
94. Appellee Yacov Yida's Opposition Brief, supra note 92, at 14.
95. Id. at 27-28.
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B. "UNAVAILABLE" PRECEDENT
In its brief as appellant, the government cited a 1972 U.S.
Supreme Court decision for the proposition that, generally,
when witnesses are beyond the subpoena power of the United
States, they are unavailable for the purposes of the hearsay
analysis.96 The case involved a criminal retrial in which the key
witness-a permanent resident of Sweden-refused to return to
testify in the new trial.97 In finding that the state court "was
powerless to compel his attendance at the second trial," the Su-
preme Court ruled that the witness was unavailable. 98 There-
fore, it was appropriate to admit the witness's prior, cross-
examined testimony. 99
1. Deported Witnesses
The government then cited two Ninth Circuit cases to show
that, even when the reason for the witnesses' absence is depor-
tation by the government, the court has found these witnesses
to be unavailable, absent a showing of intentional miscon-
duct.1 00 In United States v. Winn, federal agents took state-
ments about the defendant from alien witnesses and then di-
rectly deported them to Mexico.10 1 The government had no way
to locate or contact the witnesses when it later prosecuted the
case. 102 The Ninth Circuit upheld the trial court's ruling that
the witnesses were unavailable because they were beyond the
subpoena power of the United States and there was no way for
the government to contact them.1 0 3
In United States v. Olafson, federal agents took statements
from alien witnesses but, some time later, the government "in-
advertently" deported the witnesses to Mexico.10 4 The govern-
ment knew the whereabouts of one of the witnesses, contacted
him, and tried to persuade him to return and testify.1 05 When
the witness refused, the government successfully moved to ad-
96. Brief for the United States as Appellant, supra note 1, at 17 (citing
Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972)).
97. Mancusi, 408 U.S. at 209.
98. Id. at 212-13.
99. Id. at 216.
100. Brief for the United States as Appellant, supra note 1, at 16-18.
101. United States v. Winn, 767 F.2d 527, 529-30 (9th Cir. 1985).
102. Id. at 530.
103. Id.
104. United States v. Olafson, 213 F.3d 435, 438 (9th Cir. 2000).
105. Id. at 442.
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mit his statements. 106 The court did not address the question of
whether the deportations were negligent, but, instead, found
that in contacting and attempting to persuade the witness, the
government satisfied its duty to use reasonable means to pro-
cure the witness's presence at trial.10 7
2. Review of Conduct Before Witness's Absence
In arguing that the government's deportation of Reziniano
was negligent, and therefore not reasonable, Yida distinguishes
Winn and Olafson as holding only that the testimony of de-
ported, alien witnesses may be admissible where the deporta-
tions were not negligent. 108 Yida also introduced several federal
cases to illustrate precedent for explicitly considering the pro-
ponent's pre-absence conduct when evaluating reasonable
means for procuring the declarant's presence at trial.1 09 The
most important of these-and the only binding precedent-is
Motes v. United States, in which the Supreme Court held that
testimony may not be admitted when the witness's absence is
"due to the negligence of the prosecution."' 10
The facts in Motes suggest, though, that the prosecution's
conduct was more wrongful than negligent. 1 After the crimi-
nal trial had begun, the government's witness was taken from
jail and placed in charge "not of an officer but of another wit-
ness for the Government with instructions. . . to allow [the
witness] to stay at a hotel at night with his family."112 On the
day when the witness was called to testify, "and within an hour
of being called, [the witness] was in the corridor of the court
house. [But w]hen called to testify he did not appear."113
While Justice John Marshall Harlan used the word "negli-
gence" to describe the conduct in Motes,114 the government in
106. Id. at 442-43.
107. Id.
108. Appellee Yacov Yida's Opposition Brief, supra note 92, at 11-13.
109. See id. at 14-16. Yida cites, among others, United States v. Wilson, 36
F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1182 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (holding that the government must
"make reasonable and good faith efforts before the witness left the United
States" in order to establish unavailability), and United States v. Mann, 590
F.2d 361, 368 (1st Cir. 1978) (holding that the duty to use reasonable means to
secure the presence of a witness includes the "duty to use reasonable means to
prevent a present witness from becoming absent").
110. 178 U.S. 458, 474 (1900).
111. Seeid. at 471.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See id.
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Yida argued that the case was not intended to establish a uni-
versal standard of negligence for analyzing pre-absence conduct
because the prosecutorial conduct in Motes was more wrongful
than simple negligence. 115 In addition, the precedents cited in
support of the Motes's holding specifically involve "wrongful
procurement" and "contrivance" to prevent a witness from testi-
fying-not simple negligence. 116
3. Distinguishing Yida: Prosecutorial Reasonableness
If a more neutral reading of Motes results in an intention-
al-wrongdoing or reckless-negligence standard, what explains
the Ninth Circuit's narrower reading? The answer is in the
court's interpretation of the existing Ninth Circuit precedents,
Winn and Olafson. The Yida court distinguished these prece-
dents on the basis that the prosecutor in both cases lacked an
"affirmative role in the witness's deportation."' 17 In Winn, the
witnesses were deported without the prosecutor's "knowledge
or involvement,"' 8 and in Olafson, the witnesses were "'inad-
vertently' deported by the government."' 1 9 The Yida court
found, however, that the government "knowingly and willingly
deported Reziniano knowing that he was an important witness
for their case."120 In distinguishing Winn and Olafson, the
Ninth Circuit determined that the question of prosecutorial in-
volvement or knowledge in the witness's deportation was one of
first impression. 121 In highlighting the prosecution's failure to
seek guidance before Reziniano's release, the court found a ba-
sis in negligence for invalidating the government's conduct
without finding that it acted with intent to cause Reziniano's
absence.122
C. THE NEW REASONABLENESS STANDARD
The fine tuning of the Yida holding requires a final ele-
ment: the finding, by both the district court and the court of
115. Brief for the United States as Appellant, supra note 1, at 23-24 n.6.
116. See Motes, 178 U.S. at 471-73.
117. See United States v. Yida, 498 F.3d 945, 953 (9th Cir. 2007).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 954 n.10.
120. Id.
121. See id.
122. Id. at 954, 956 (finding that the 'necessity" to introduce prior testi-
mony is supportable when 'the declarant's inability to give live testimony is in
no way the fault of the State"' (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 166
(1970))).
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appeals, that the government acted in good faith in deporting
Reziniano. 123 The government sought and received "firm assur-
ances" that Reziniano would return to testify. 124 The govern-
ment secured advance approval from supervisors at the De-
partment of Homeland Security to parole Reziniano back into
the United States in the event of a retrial.1 25 Finally, the gov-
ernment offered to pay for Reziniano's travel, lodging, food, and
incidental expenses if it would be necessary for him to re-
turn.126 The court of appeals clearly stated, "At the outset, we
agree with the district court's determination that the govern-
ment was neither 'motivated in any way by bad faith' nor 'en-
gaged in deliberate misconduct [when it] remove[d] the materi-
al witness warrant and allow[ed] Reziniano to return to
Israel."' 127 The court found in this instance, however, that ac-
cording trustworthiness in Reziniano under the circumstances
was not "operat[ing] in a competent manner." 128 The court held
that unavailability will not be found when "the prosecutor has
acted in an 'empty-head pure-heart' way."'12 9
The Yida court found the following: First, Reziniano was
absent, and his prior statements were testimonial. 130 Second,
the government acted in good faith deporting and seeking the
return of Reziniano. 131 Third, despite its good faith, the gov-
ernment acted negligently in allowing Reziniano to be de-
ported. 132 And fourth, the government's efforts after Reziniano
left the country were reasonable. 33 The court concluded that
123. Id. at 957.
124. The government based its belief that Reziniano's assurances were le-
gitimate on his especially cooperative demeanor prior to, and during, the first
trial. See Brief for the United States as Appellant, supra note 1, at 4-6.
125. Yida, 498 F.3d at 948.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 957.
128. See id. at 952.
129. Id. (quoting the Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11 relating to the restriction against "patently frivolous argu-
ments").
130. See id. at 947, 949-50 (noting that "[a]ll parties agree that Reziniano's
statements qualify as former testimony which was subject to cross-
examination in accordance with 804(b)(1)" and that Reziniano has continued
to refuse to return to testify in the retrial).
131. See id. at 949, 957 (noting the district court finding that the govern-
ment acted in good faith).
132. See id. at 960 ("[T]he government's decision to deport Reziniano .
was not reasonable .... ).
133. See id. at 953-54 ("Olafson establishes that the government's efforts
made after a witness's deportation are reasonable if an affirmative, good faith
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the government's good faith release of the material witness
warrant, leading to Reziniano's release from custody and de-
portation, comprised negligent conduct that was sufficiently
unreasonable to fail the reasonable-means test of Rule 804 and,
therefore, his prior testimony was inadmissible.13 4
III. YIDA'S OVERREACHING AND ERRONEOUS
RATIONALE
Yida presents the federal courts with a model opportunity
to clarify the operation of Confrontation Clause precedent vis-&-
vis conduct affecting the availability of material witnesses. The
government should apply for Supreme Court review of the
Ninth Circuit's interpretation and application of statutory and
case law, and the lower federal courts should distinguish Yida
as applicable only on its particular facts.
A. THE UNAVAILABILITY STANDARD: FROM INTENTIONAL
WRONGDOING TO REASONABLENESS
The Yida court's removal of the intent element entirely
from the pre-absence conduct analysis--creating a presumption
that good faith conduct, though negligent, will fail the test in
Rule 804(a)(5)-appears to be a substantial narrowing of the
interpretation of federal statutes and precedent. Rule 804(a)(5)
allows admission of hearsay if the declarant is "absent from the
hearing and the proponent of his statement has been unable to
procure [his] attendance ... by process or other reasonable
means.'135 The Advisory Committee's Notes on the Evidence
Rules cite several sources in support of Rule 804(a)(5), and
none of these sources indicate that good faith conduct, though
negligent, should fail the reasonable-means test and bar ad-
missibility.13 6 In addition to the provision preventing propo-
attempt is made to convince the witness to return to the United States to testi-
fy .... I).
134. Id. at 960-61.
135. FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(5).
136. Id. R. 804 advisory committee's note. First, McCormick addresses the
"best evidence" rule of the Rule 1002 requirement that the original document
must be produced to prove an out-of-court event. 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE
§ 234, at 92-96 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006). Second, California allows
a finding of "unavailable" where the proponent has exercised "reasonable," but
unsuccessful, diligence to procure the declarant's attendance. CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 240(a)(5) (West 2006). Third, Kansas provides that declarants may be "un-
available" if they are beyond the court's subpoena power or are absent despite
the proponent's diligent efforts to produce their appearance. KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-459(g) (2006). Fourth, New Jersey law states that declarants may not be
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nents from acting intentionally to cause the absence of a decla-
rant, if Congress wished for Rule 804(a) to establish an express
duty to prevent witnesses from becoming unavailable, it is rea-
sonable to expect that it would have drafted the rule to do so. 137
1. Retaining Intent Is More Consistent with Statutory and
Case Law
First, Rule 804(a) allows hearsay to be admitted under one
of five circumstances. 138 The final sentence of Rule 804(a)
states that, even if hearsay qualifies under one of the five cir-
cumstances, it will be barred if the witness's absence is due to
the "procurement or wrongdoing" of the proponent. 139 As ar-
gued in the government's appellate brief in Yida, removing the
intent element from the "unavailable" test renders the final
sentence of Rule 804(a) superfluous. 140 Because it is possible for
a proponent simultaneously to feign diligent activity to secure
the presence of a witness while purposefully procuring the wit-
ness's absence through wrongdoing, the final sentence of Rule
804(a) acts as a catch-all provision to protect against this situa-
tion. 141 But applying a pure negligence standard to the five
tests in Rule 804(a)(1)-(5) means that it will never be necessary
to reach the subject of wrongdoing in the first place. 142 If pro-
ponents' acts meet the lesser standard of negligence, thereby
failing one or more of the five tests, they would necessarily fail
the procurement-or-wrongdoing test in the final sentence. It is
unlikely that Congress intended to draft Rule 804(a) to include
such an unnecessary provision, and statutory construction
"unavailable" when they are absent due to the "wrongdoing or culpable neg-
lect" of the proponent. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-62(6)(d) (West 2006) (empha-
sis added). Finally, in Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 720, 724-25 (1968), ad-
mission of cross-examined, testimonial hearsay was barred in a state criminal
trial where the declarant was in federal prison in an adjacent state, and the
government "made no attempt" to secure the declarant's presence on grounds
that the declarant was outside the jurisdiction. None of these sources suggest
that simple negligence shall preclude a finding that the declarant is unavaila-
ble.
137. See Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 89-90 (1823) ("[W]here the
words of a law, treaty, or contract, have a plain and obvious meaning, all con-
struction, in hostility with such meaning, is excluded. This is a maxim of law,
and a dictate of common sense .... ").
138. FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(1)-(5).
139. Id. R. 804(a).
140. Brief for the United States as Appellant, supra note 1, at 30 n.8.
141. United States v. Yida, 498 F.3d 945, 956 (9th Cir. 2007).
142. FED. R. EVID. 804(a); see Brief for the United States as Appellant, su-
pra note 1, at 31-32.
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principles require that the rule be read to avoid this result
whenever possible. 143
Second, the "forfeiture by wrongdoing" principle, expressly
incorporated in the Evidence Rules, requires intent.144 This
rule prohibits parties from excluding hearsay when it can be
shown that the party "engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing
that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the
declarant."'145 The Advisory Committee's Notes state that the
forfeiture by wrongdoing provision was "added to provide that a
party forfeits the right to object on hearsay grounds to the ad-
mission of a declarant's prior statement when the party's deli-
berate wrongdoing or acquiescence therein procured the unavai-
lability of the declarant as a witness." 146 The U.S. Supreme
Court described the principle more than a century before it was
codified, writing that "if [the accused] voluntarily keeps the
witnesses away, he cannot insist on his privilege [of confronta-
tion]." 147 This language clearly indicates that the common law
origins and current statutory basis for forfeiture of the confron-
tation right is intentional wrongdoing.
The Yida court did not indicate that its availability rule-
applying a simple negligence standard to conduct before and af-
ter the declarant's absence-applied only when the defendant's
constitutional confrontation right is implicated. 148 Applying the
Yida rule to defendants equally, whether the hearsay is ad-
143. Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U.S. 56, 74 (2003) ("It is 'a cardinal prin-
ciple of statutory construction' that 'a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so
construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be su-
perfluous, void, or insignificant."' (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167,
174 (2001))).
144. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6); id. R. 804 advisory committee's note to the
1997 amendments.
145. Id. R. 804(b)(6); see Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006)
("[O]ne who obtains the absence of a witness by wrongdoing forfeits the consti-
tutional right to confrontation.").
146. FED. R. EVID. 804 advisory committee's note (emphasis added).
147. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1878) (emphasis added).
148. The district court did, however, note the connection between the con-
frontation right and the government's conduct. See United States v. Yida, No.
CR 00-00274 CRB, 2006 WL 1980390, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2006) ('The
importance of the Government's vigilance in preserving a witness's availability
is underscored by the vital Sixth Amendment confrontation rights impli-
cated."), aff'd, 498 F.3d 945 (9th Cir. 2007). The Ninth Circuit explicitly based
its opinion on an interpretation of Rule 804 and did not state whether the pre-
and post-absence negligence test, vis-&-vis admissibility under Rule 804(b)(1),
is activated only when the confrontation right is implicated. See Yida, 498
F.3d at 962 n.16.
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verse or supportive-such as whether the confrontation right is
implicated or not-produces peculiar results. If defendants for-
feit their confrontation right to block adverse hearsay only
when they intentionally make witnesses absent, why should
they forfeit their due process right to admit supporting hearsay
if they unintentionally make witnesses absent? Though the
"forfeiture" and "unavailable" principles address different cir-
cumstances, the policy considerations are the same-a prefer-
ence for live testimony over out-of-court statements and a pro-
tection against unfair manipulation of testimonial evidence. 149
The Yida rule, as applied to defendants in this way, would bar
the admission of exculpatory hearsay when the defendant's
good faith actions, though negligent, cause a witness to refuse,
or to be unable, to testify at trial. History and legislative intent
do not appear to explain or support the striking dissimilarity in
the standards of conduct that, after Yida, would trigger each
principle's application. 150
Existing Supreme Court guidance on the proponent's stan-
dard of conduct is unclear and deserving of clarification. 151 In
ruling that there must be some degree of intent to cause the
declarant's absence to deny a finding of unavailability, the Su-
preme Court and lower federal courts will normalize the appli-
cation of Confrontation Clause precedent. In expressly ac-
knowledging the intent requirement, the courts will establish a
stable, extensible rule that appropriately integrates the consti-
tutional rights of defendants with the constitutional liberty in-
terests of witnesses.
2. Retaining Intent Is More Fair for Prosecution and Defense
If negligence is a "failure to exercise the standard of care
that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in a
149. See FED. R. EVID. 804 advisory committee's note ("[T]estimony given
on the stand in person is preferred over hearsay, and hearsay, if of the speci-
fied quality, is preferred over complete loss of the evidence of the declarant.").
150. See generally id.
151. Though there are examples of federal cases in which pre-absence neg-
ligence (or failure to use reasonable means) is specifically identified as a fatal
factor-for example, United States v. Martinez-Perez, 916 F.2d 1020, 1023 (5th
Cir. 1990), United States v. Guadian-Salazar, 824 F.2d 344, 346-47 (5th Cir.
1987) (per curiam), and United States v. Mann, 590 F.2d 361, 365-66 (1st Cir.
1978)-all binding Ninth Circuit and U.S. Supreme Court precedents either
ignore the question or use the word "negligence" to describe conduct that fails
a higher standard of wrongdoing. See, e.g., Motes v. United States, 178 U.S.
458, 474 (1900).
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similar situation,"'152 on what basis, after Yida, are we prepared
to evaluate the unintentional acts of the "reasonably prudent"
defendant facing serious criminal charges? This scenario seems
patently dangerous: Rule 804(a)(2) allows a witness who refuses
to testify despite a court order to be unavailable. 153 Yet an in-
advertent, even mistaken, act of the defendant-one later
found to be unreasonable and the proximate cause of the wit-
ness's refusal to testify-would bar the admission of the cross-
examined, exculpatory testimony. 15 4 The Sixth Amendment and
the Evidence Rules should not bar testimonial hearsay where
there is absolutely no intent to encourage or procure the ab-
sence of the declarant-witness. It is irresponsible to establish a
rule that risks extraordinary, exculpatory testimony through
inadvertent-even accidental-conduct.
The federal courts may administer facts identical to Yida
by holding that the deportation of a material witness before the
final disposition of a criminal trial-without notifying the court
in advance, and without any means for securing the witness's
return-constitutes intent to cause the witness's absence. De-
portation under these circumstances would preclude admission
of the witness's prior testimony. This conclusion allows for the
unimpeded operation of the federal material witness statute,155
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 15,156 and Federal Rule of
Evidence 804.157 It also substantially protects the confrontation
right of defendants facing witnesses subject to deportation be-
cause the district court, upon receiving advance notice of intent
to deport a witness, may order that the witness be held, if jus-
tice requires. 158 This solution effectively removes the responsi-
152. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1061 (8th ed. 2004).
153. FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(2).
154. See United States v. Yida, 498 F.3d 945, 957-58 (9th Cir. 2007) (not-
ing the absence of evidence that the government intended to cause Reziniano's
absence and emphasizing that the mistaken placement of trust in Reziniano
was a core factor in its finding that the government failed to use reasonable
means). Note that, under Yida, if the unintentionally negligent defendant had
managed to get an admissible video deposition before the allegedly negligent
conduct occurred, the now absent witness's testimony might be admissible as a
hearsay exception. Id. at 959.
155. 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2000) (providing that, where justice allows, deten-
tion may not continue if a deposition may be properly preserved pursuant to
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure).
156. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15 (describing deposition requirements and providing
that admissibility is controlled by the Federal Rules of Evidence).
157. FED. R. EVID. 804 (describing the circumstances in which the deposi-
tion of an unavailable declarant may be admissible as evidence).
158. 18 U.S.C. § 3144.
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bility of material witness detention from the prosecution or de-
fense and places it with the justice system itself, via the district
court. Since the rights implicated are constitutionally funda-
mental, 15 9 interlocutory appeal of orders should be allowed. 160
3. Ignoring Intent Creates an Overbroad Solution to a Narrow
Problem
The Yida court seeks to guard against prosecutorial abuse
of the deportation of noncitizens by expressly subjecting all pre-
and post-absence conduct to a tort-like negligence review. 16 1
The result is a near-boundless inquiry beginning with the mo-
ment that the proponent knows that it has an interest in the
testimony and ending with the absolutely final disposition of
the matter-including, presumably, retrials resulting from
hung juries, as occurred in Yida, or successful motions for new
trials based on myriad possible circumstances. 162  A
straightforward application of Yida would prohibit the admis-
sion of prior cross-examined testimony where, at any point dur-
ing this period, the proponent inadvertently, though negligent-
ly, caused the declarant to refuse to testify in court, leave the
jurisdiction of the United States, or otherwise become unavail-
able. 163
The federal courts should pursue an equally effective pro-
tection against prosecutorial misconduct that is free of the
sweeping risk. Courts may retain the intentional wrongdoing
standard and hold that the deportation of a testimonial wit-
159. For criminal defendants, see U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the
witnesses against him .... ). For witnesses, see id. amend. IV ("The right of
the people to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable ... seizures,
shall not be violated."), and id. amend. V ("No person shall ... be deprived
of... liberty.., without due process of law.").
160. Federal interlocutory appeals are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2000),
which provides, in subsection (e), that the U.S. Supreme Court may prescribe
rules, consistent with § 2072, allowing interlocutory appeals not otherwise
provided in the statute.
161. See United States v. Yida, 498 F.3d 945, 955-56 (9th Cir. 2007) ("[I~t
is clear that the appropriate time-frame should not be limited to the govern-
ment's efforts to procure Reziniano's testimony after it let him be deported,
but should instead include an assessment of the government's affirmative con-
duct which allowed Reziniano to be deported to Israel in the first in-
stance....").
162. See id. at 956 ("We read 'efforts undertaken prior to trial,' to include
the government's actions during the time between the declaration of a mistrial
and the commencement of the retrial ....").
163. See id. at 957, 960; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1061 (8th ed. 2004).
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ness-during the period of foreseeable need for the witness's
presence, and without notifying the court-is sufficient to es-
tablish intentional wrongdoing that would bar the admission of
the witness's testimony. This rule would reconcile precedents
addressing legitimately accidental deportation-and allowing
admission of prior testimony-with the plain language and leg-
islative intent of the Evidence Rules, while protecting defen-
dants from forfeiture of exculpatory testimony by legitimately
unintentional conduct. 164
B. MATERIAL WITNESSES: RESTRAINT AND DETENTION
After Yida, as prosecutors in the Ninth Circuit prepare
evidence for trial, the likely outcome of the simple negligence
rule on all pre-absence conduct is that more material witnesses
will be detained as a standard practice. 16 5 When a prosecutor,
in good faith, decides not to seek a material witness warrant, or
allows a detained witness to be released based on the witness's
agreement to testify, or decides not to seek protective custody
based on an objective assessment of risk-and where this con-
duct may be found to be negligent-it is logical that the prose-
cutor will pursue the more severe measure of detention as a
precaution.
Aggressively pursuing material witness detention, as in-
surance against the risk of losing valuable testimony through
negligence, directly conflicts with the federal material witness
statute. 166 This statute forbids witness detention when the wit-
ness's testimony can be adequately preserved via deposition.1 67
In balancing the defendant's constitutional confrontation right
with the witness's constitutional liberty interest, the statute
164. See United States v. Olafson, 213 F.3d 435, 438, 442-43 (9th Cir.
2000) (allowing admissions of nondeposition hearsay of inadvertently deported
material witnesses); United States v. Winn, 767 F.2d 527, 530-31 (9th Cir.
1985) (same).
165. Brief for the United States as Appellant, supra note 1, at 50.
166. 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2000) ("No material witness may be detained be-
cause of inability to comply with any condition of release if the testimony of
such witness can adequately be secured by deposition, and if further detention
is not necessary to prevent a failure of justice. Release of a material witness
may be delayed for a reasonable period of time until the deposition of the wit-
ness can be taken pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.").
167. Id.
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clearly portrays witness detention as a last resort,168 and sev-
eral federal courts have held similarly.169
Additionally, the material witness statute, in concert with
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 15, expressly allows de-
tained material witnesses to petition for release in exchange for
giving a deposition under oath.170 The result, in every case in
which the court finds that the testimony can be adequately pre-
served, appears to be a statutory bar against detention, regard-
less of the witness's intentions, promises, or likelihood of re-
turning to testify. 171 The deposition is only admissible if the
declarant is unavailable, 72 so the proponent retains some duty
to use reasonable means to procure the declarant's presence at
trial. But surely that duty is altered when the court orders the
declarant's release from custody on the grounds that a deposi-
tion is presumptively adequate. 173
Under the federal material witness statute and Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 15, it is illogical to establish a rule
in which material witness detention is the only sure route to
admissibility of pretrial testimony. The Yida rule penalizes
168. See id. § 3142(b) ("The judicial officer shall order the pretrial release
of the person on personal recognizance, or upon execution of an unsecured ap-
pearance bond in an amount specified by the court... unless the judicial offic-
er determines that such release will not reasonably assure the appearance of
the person as required or will endanger the safety of any other person or the
community.").
169. See, e.g., Torres-Ruiz v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 120 F.3d 933, 935 (9th Cir.
1997) ("Absent a 'failure of justice,' the witness must be released." (citing Agui-
lar-Ayala v. Ruiz, 973 F.2d 411, 413 (5th Cir. 1992))); United States v. Linton,
502 F. Supp. 878, 879-80 (D. Nev. 1980) (holding that a custodial material
witness was entitled to deposition and release notwithstanding his failure to
appear in prior proceedings, and that the deposition would be admissible in
the event that the witness failed to appear, despite a court order, at the subse-
quent trial). But see United States v. Lai Fa Chen, 214 F.R.D. 578, 582 (N.D.
Cal. 2003) (holding that, although Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 15(a)
and 18 U.S.C. § 3144 "evince[] a strong policy that material witnesses should
be released ... after ... depositions," courts need not order "automatic and
immediate release" but should address the issue of post-deposition detention
upon "separate motion").
170. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15.
171. See Torres-Ruiz, 120 F.3d at 936; Lai Fa Chen, 214 F.R.D. at 582 (not-
ing that a party moving for a Criminal Procedure Rule 15 deposition "need not
show a 'substantial likelihood' that the proposed deponent will be unavailable
for trial").
172. FED. R. EVID. 804(a)-(b).
173. See Linton, 502 F. Supp. at 878-80 (holding that taking a properly
preserved deposition would not relieve the proponent from using reasonable
means to produce the declarant, but strongly implying that, if such production
were not possible, the deposition would be admissible at trial).
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proponents where a good faith release from custody, or a failure
to seek it, is deemed negligent-even though the declarant has
a statutory right to challenge detention, and even though the
subsequent duty to secure the declarant's appearance at trial
may be diminished after a deposition and court-ordered release.
The federal courts may resolve this disorder by holding
that the liberty interests of detained material witnesses are
sufficiently fundamental to warrant a strict-scrutiny analysis.
Under strict scrutiny, the hearsay proponent would be required
to show that continued detention would serve a compelling in-
terest and that it is necessary to serve that interest.174 The
proponent would per se satisfy the compelling interest prong
where the circumstances implicate a defendant's confrontation
right. But the proponent would justify continued detention only
by showing that it is necessary to detain the material witness.
When no form of deposition would adequately preserve the wit-
ness's testimony, or where a miscarriage of justice would oth-
erwise result, justice would require that the witness be held in
custody. This principle seems eminently reasonable under ex-
isting federal statutes, the Evidence Rules, the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, and the U.S. Constitution. 17 5
C. VIDEO DEPOSITIONS AS A PROPHYLACTIC MEASURE
The Yida court directly stated that videotaping a deposi-
tion of Reziniano before releasing and deporting him would
have "altered" the court's assessment.1 76 Unfortunately, this is
an absurd position that vitiates the text of the Evidence Rules
and the confrontation principles on which the opinion is
based. 177
174. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (finding that laws
subject to the "most rigid scrutiny" must be shown to be "necessary" to the at-
tainment of the state's compelling interest).
175. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) ("[T]he Fifth Amendment
protects aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful from invidious dis-
crimination by the Federal Government."); Aguilar-Ayala v. Ruiz, 973 F.2d
411, 419-20 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding that illegal aliens have a strong liberty
interest in freedom from detention when a deposition "serves as an adequate
alternative"); United States v. Eufracio-Torres, 890 F.2d 266, 270 (10th Cir.
1989) (finding that illegal aliens are "guaranteed Fifth Amendment due
process").
176. United States v. Yida, 498 F.3d 945, 959 (9th Cir. 2007).
177. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing that the criminal defendant has
a right to "confront" the "witnesses against him," not the "testimony" against
him); FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(5) (requiring the proponent to attempt to procure
the declarant's "attendance," not the declarant's "testimony").
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First, as the court concedes, the video deposition, like the
transcript of prior testimony, is admissible only if Reziniano is
found to be unavailable-i.e., if the government is found to be
nonnegligent. 178 The government argues that, since the video
deposition is no more admissible than the printed transcript, it
is irrelevant to the unavailability analysis whether a video de-
position was taken. 179 Both pieces of evidence are excluded or
admitted equally. 180
The Yida court responds that, because the testimonial val-
ue of the video deposition is so much higher than the printed
transcript, its "assessment of the reasonableness of the gov-
ernment's actions would be altered if its efforts included the
taking of a witness's video-recorded deposition before allowing
deportation to occur." 18' To the extent that prophylactic video
depositions would change the assessment of the unavailability
analysis, this rule-that the government's release negligently
caused the witness's absence, except if the government thought
ahead and recorded a video deposition-is incongruous. In both
scenarios, the government's conduct vis-&-vis the witness's
availability at trial is the same. And in both scenarios, the wit-
ness is equally absent. The only difference is that there is a
video deposition of some of the witness's testimony to stand in
place of the absent witness at trial.
If taking a video deposition could be proven, in some way,
to contribute to the likelihood that the witness would appear
and testify at trial, then it could rationally be considered in the
calculus of whether the hearsay proponent attempted to "secure
the presence" of the witness by reasonable means. Taking a
video deposition, however, is not a reasonable means to secure
the presence of the witness. The relevant hearsay exception in
Yida does not allow the proponent to secure the declarant's tes-
timony at trial by reasonable means; 182 it requires that the pro-
ponent secure the declarant's presence at trial by reasonable
means. 183
Logically, a failure to record a deposition is a failure to pro-
cure testimony. In its calculus, the Yida court discounts the
178. Yida, 498 F.3d at 959.
179. Brief for the United States as Appellant, supra note 1, at 9.
180. See id.
181. Yida, 498 F.3d at 959.
182. FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(5).
183. Id. The court does not argue that "presence" is equivalent to video-
taped deposition testimony. See Yida, 498 F.3d at 945.
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government's reasonableness-under Rule 804(a)(5)-by the
"value" of its failure to procure this testimony. But Rule
804(a)(5) requires proponents to procure attendance and places
no value on attempts to procure testimony.1 8 4 Including testi-
mony-preservation activities in the calculus of whether a party
has "used reasonable means to secure the presence of the wit-
ness" imports an inappropriate type of reasonableness question
into the analysis, making the entire inquiry less clear, less ex-
tensible, and less grounded in logic.
Second, the Yida court commits several pages of its opinion
to an explanation of the history, principles, and value of face-to-
face confrontation.18 5 Much of the rationale in the opinion's
supporting precedent directly addresses the value of the jury's
face-to-face examination of the character of the declarant. 186
The court references other long-uncontested benefits of the con-
frontation right, including the ability to cross-examine the
declarant live at trial and the ability to make use of late-
breaking factual developments that may have occurred since
the preservation of the prior testimony. 187 By suggesting that
the government's taking of a video deposition of Reziniano
would have altered the court's assessment of reasonableness,
the court appears to be willing to forfeit-or at least substan-
tially discount-all of these benefits in favor of playing a video
deposition for the jury.1 88 The court's rationale for denying ad-
mission of Reziniano's testimony in the first place is substan-
tially undercut by its insistence that a video deposition would
have been admissible in place of the printed transcript. 8 9
Distinguishing Yida, the federal courts should hold that
video depositions, appropriately cross-examined, represent a
presumptively adequate method for preserving testimony of ab-
sent witnesses who are legitimately unavailable. Where there
has been no prosecutorial misconduct, no witness intimidation
184. FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(5).
185. Yida, 498 F.3d at 950-52.
186. See id. (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); Mattox v.
United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895); NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 190
F.2d 429 (2d Cir.1951); and Broad. Music, Inc. v. Havana Madrid Rest. Corp.,
175 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1949)).
187. See id. at 950-51.
188. Compare id. at 951 ("The ability to cross-examine a witness at trial
using the most current investigative information available cuts to the heart of
the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause."), with id. at 959 ("A video depo-
sition... would be almost as good as if Reziniano had testified live at the
second trial .....
189. Id.
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by the defense, and no other intentional wrongdoing, the par-
ties should be free to elicit and cross-examine testimony from
material witnesses who would then be free to return to their
homes.
This presumption, of course, would not relieve parties of
the duty to use reasonable means to procure witnesses' appear-
ance at trial. Regardless of the existence of a video deposition,
the proponent would still be required to demonstrate that it
had attempted in good faith and with reasonable diligence to
convince the witness to return and testify in person. 190 The va-
lidity of the video deposition, however, would not hinge on the
success or failure of those efforts, nor would the presence of a
video deposition alter the assessment of whether the propo-
nent's efforts to produce the witness were reasonable.
Under this rule, the appropriately cross-examined video-
taped testimony-accompanied by reasonable efforts, even if
unsuccessful-would withstand a challenge on Confrontation
Clause grounds. As argued in Yida by the district court, the
appellate court, and the amici curiae briefs, properly preserved
video depositions may be "very close in effect to the optimal sit-
uation, in which [the witness] testifies live at the [second] tri-
al." 191
D. OTHER CONTEXTS-TOURISM AND INTERNATIONAL
CONSPIRATORIAL CRIMES
Yida's forfeiture-by-negligence principle may produce strik-
ing effects in other criminal contexts. An estimated fifty-four
million international tourists will have visited the United
States in 2007.192 Applying recent tourist crime rates to this
population suggests that tens of thousands of these foreign na-
tionals may be the victims of violent crime. 193 The admissibility
of their pretrial testimonial evidence, and that of their witness
family-members and fellow travelers, is contingent on the de-
termination of their unavailability if they are allowed to return
to their home countries. International human trafficking, as
well, represents a pervasive criminal circumstance in which in-
nocent foreign nationals-victims and unwitting bystander-
conspirators-may provide testimonial statements relevant to
the innocence or guilt of the accused. Surely, this testimony is
190. FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(5).
191. Yida, 498 F.3d at 959.
192. Walker, supra note 15.
193. See Crotts, supra note 15, at 1-2.
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often the most valuable evidence for defendants and prosecu-
tors alike, and is equally subject to forfeiture in the availability
analysis.
1. International Tourism
Though Reziniano was a convicted felon, 194 and this ap-
pears to have been a factor in the Yida court's rationale,195 the
simple negligence rule, applied in situations in which interna-
tional tourists serve as material witnesses, is likely to produce
undesirable results. Under the Yida rule, failure to detain an
international tourist who has indicated a desire to return
home, beyond U.S. subpoena power, would appear to be negli-
gence. 196 Even if it is per se reasonable to trust a nonfelon tour-
ist's promise to return, if offered, what if the tourist communi-
cates a refusal to return?
If the tourist is held in custody on a material witness war-
rant, the material witness statute requires, if possible, a prop-
erly preserved deposition and release. 197 The Yida rule, howev-
er, advises that a prosecutor following that command-
releasing a witness with knowledge of the witness's intention to
leave the United States and with no way to compel the wit-
ness's return-is acting negligently.198 As a result, the witness
would not be unavailable, and the properly preserved, cross-
examined testimony would not be admissible under Rule
804(a)(5). 199 The prosecutor's duty to use reasonable means to
prevent the tourist's absence would appear to require at least
the seizure of the tourist's passport, and, depending on the
trustworthiness of the tourist, periodic appearances, electronic
monitoring, or incarceration. 200
194. United States v. Yida, No. CR 00-00274 CRB, 2006 WL 1980390, at *4
(N.D. Cal. 2006), aff'd, 498 F.3d 945 (9th Cir. 2007).
195. See id.
196. See id. at *6 (noting that the government "permitted Reziniano to be
deported based primarily on his oral assurance that he would return" and
that, under these circumstances, the government's efforts were "insufficient
and unreasonable").
197. 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2000); FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(a)(1)-(2).
198. Unless, perhaps, the prosecutor had secured a videotaped deposition
that is deemed admissible. See Yida, 2006 WL 1980390, at *6.
199. FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(5).
200. See United States v. Yida, 498 F.3d 945, 959 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting
that Reziniano's release "might have been accompanied by the confiscation of
his passport, service of a subpoena, and the imposition of conditions on his re-
lease such as home confinement, limited travel, and/or some form of electronic
detention").
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Though the average criminal trial in federal district court
is completed in less than five days,201 the average time between
initial filing and final disposition of felonies is over seven and a
half months. 202 Since witnesses may be required to give testi-
mony and remain available even late in this period-in the
event of a retrial, for example-some tourists may be re-
strained, to some degree, for several months. It is reasonable to
predict that this circumstance would lead to lower rates of re-
porting of federal crimes, less cooperation from witnesses, and
fewer convictions of (otherwise) provable criminal offenses. In
modern times, with tens of millions of foreign nationals visiting
the United States each year, a careful weighing of defendants'
confrontation rights with witnesses' liberty interests should al-
low for cross-examined depositions to be taken in the best poss-
ible manner and for witnesses to be set free. At trial, the relia-
bility and testimonial value of admitted depositions would be
weighed by the factfinders in relation to all other evidence, in-
cluding other, live witness testimony.
2. International Conspiratorial Crime
Whether due to the hardships of poverty or political pres-
sures, many foreign victims and witnesses of immigration and
human trafficking crimes will be strongly motivated to return
to their homes as quickly as possible. Requiring detention of
these individuals, or even restraint within U.S. borders, in or-
der to preserve their cross-examined testimony, would often in-
flict a grievous and unnecessary suffering on them in exchange
for their cooperation with U.S. law enforcement. Beyond the
humanitarian considerations, there are constitutional and sta-
tutory dimensions to this problem, as well. The liberty interest
in freedom from unnecessary material witness detention ex-
tends to illegal aliens,203 and a plain-language application of
201. Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Crime: Assessing the Impact on the Fed-
eral Courts, 543 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 39, 48 (1996).
202. Federal Court Management Statistics, Judicial Caseload Profile Re-
port, http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cmsd2006.pl (select "All District Courts";
then click the "Generate" button) (last visited Apr. 25, 2008) (reporting that in
2006 the median time from filing to disposition for felony criminal matters
was 7.6 months).
203. See Aguilar-Ayala v. Ruiz, 973 F.2d 411, 419-20 (5th Cir. 1992)
("[Ulndocumented aliens have an overriding liberty interest in not being de-
tained as material witnesses, when the deposition procedure serves as an ade-
quate alternative to prolonged detention."); United States v. Eufracio-Torres,
890 F.2d 266, 270 (10th Cir. 1989) (finding that illegal aliens "are 'persons'
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the material witness statute would allow these witnesses to pe-
tition for deposition and release. 204 Federal court rulings pre-
sumptively validating the admissibility of video depositions for
these genuinely "unavailable" witnesses-absent a showing of
necessity requiring detention-would balance the defendant's
interest in confrontation with the witness's interest in liberty.
There is also a strong argument that one motivation for the
sweeping detention and designation as "unlawful combatants"
of foreign citizens after the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001 is the preservation of material, testimonial hearsay for
eventual trial.205 In their respective countries, the vast majority
of these suspects and material witnesses are beyond the sub-
poena power of U.S. courts.20 6 To the extent that nondetained
terrorism witnesses are likely to leave the United States and
refuse to return and testify, it is difficult to imagine how, under
Yida, the prosecution or defense would be negligence-free with-
out seeking material witness detention.20 7 Notwithstanding
this duty, material witness detainees retain a statutory, and
constitutional, right to challenge their detentions, and, where
successful, the government must then provide something "less"
than custodial detention. 208 The Yida rule, again, encourages
hearsay proponents to seek material witness detention to insu-
late against a collateral negligence attack. But unless the court
deems a deposition inadequate for preserving the testimony,
and unless justice requires continued detention, the witness
will be deposed and released. 209 The simpler, alternative rule-
that intentional wrongdoing or intentional deportation without
advance notice to the court comprise grounds for denying un-
availability-is more efficient, equally effective, and less hostile
to witnesses' constitutional liberty interests.
guaranteed Fifth Amendment due process" and that each has "a strong consti-
tutional interest in not being detained when charged with no crimes").
204. 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2000).
205. See Benjamin J. Priester, Return of the Great Writ: Judicial Review,
Due Process, and the Detention of Alleged Terrorists as Enemy Combatants, 37
RUTGERS L.J. 39, 50-51 (2005) (noting that, under the Geneva Convention,
interrogation of prisoners of war is very limited while interrogation of "unlaw-
ful combatants" is very broad).
206. See 28 U.S.C. § 1783(a) (2000).
207. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(2); United States v. Yida, 498 F.3d 945, 957,
959 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Yida, 2006 WL 1980390, at *6 (N.D. Cal.
2006), aff'd, 498 F.3d 945.
208. See 18 U.S.C. § 3144; FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(a)(2).
209. See 18 U.S.C. § 3144.
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CONCLUSION
The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause should not
require that parties deprive material witnesses of their liberty
as a matter of course to preserve the admissibility of testimoni-
al evidence. Especially in modern times-when millions of for-
eign nationals travel to the United States each year, thousands
attempt illegal entry, and our country continues to wrestle with
the specter of terrorism-criminal procedures must safeguard
our most fundamental constitutional rights in ways that do not
violate other, equally fundamental constitutional rights.
In distinguishing Yida, the federal courts have a signifi-
cant opportunity to clarify the interpretation and interaction of
the Evidence Rules and the federal material witness statute.
The courts would appropriately balance the fundamental con-
stitutional rights of parties and witnesses by expressly estab-
lishing that intentional wrongdoing-not simple negligence-
that causes a declarant-witness to fail to testify will preclude
the admission of that witness's testimony through a hearsay
exception.
In Crawford, Justice Scalia urged that the confrontation
right in the Sixth Amendment should not be diminished to a
mere component of hearsay analysis.210 In the confrontation
cases following Yida, federal judges at all levels should affirm
that protecting witnesses' fundamental liberty interest-
freedom from detention without due process-against the same
diminution is equally fundamental to this nation's system of
law.
210. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) ("[W]e do not
think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment's protection to the
vagaries of the rules of evidence.").
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